Anthropology in Qoheleth: Paradigm for an African Christian Anthropological Vision

I. Interpretive Matters

The word Qoheleth comes from the Hebrew root qhl meaning assemble or summon. The noun qahal means a religious assembly. Qoheleth then means someone who convenes a religious assembly either to preach or teach. The traditional Hebrew and Christian positions ascribe authorship of the book to King Solomon in the tenth-century BC. The tradition goes that Solomon wrote Ecclesiastes in his old age, possibly in the 930s BC. As he grew old, he came to an honest evaluation of the essence of life that human striving after wealth, toil, accomplishments, and pleasure do not yield ultimate gain. However, some historical-critical scholars think that the book was written in the intertestamental period under the influence of Hellenistic philosophy. The article adopts the traditional Hebrew and Christian position regarding authorship and date of Qoheleth.

Some sectors of scholarship have charged Qoheleth with skepticism and pessimism based on passages such as 1:3 which asks, “What does man gain by all the toil at which he toils under the sun?” Accusations of fatalism have been made based on passages such as 1:15 which says, “What is crooked cannot be made straight, and what is lacking cannot be numbered”; 3:1–8 which indicate that seasons and times for humans are determined beyond human control; and 7:13 which asks, “Consider the work of God; who can make straight what he has made crooked?” Qoheleth’s seemingly negative evaluation of pleasure, laughter, wealth, and toil in 2:1–11 has drawn charges of asceticism against him. A charge of anti-intellectualism is made by some scholars based on their interpretation of 1:18 which says, “For in much wisdom is much vexation, and he who increases knowledge increases sorrow.” Qoheleth’s seeming ambivalence toward wisdom in passages such as 2:12–17 has led some to see the book’s theology as enigmatic. Some have charged Qoheleth with agnosticism when he confesses that he does not know whether the one who will inherit his wealth will be wise or foolish (2:18–21) and that no one knows the destination of the spirit of men and the spirit of a beast (3:19–21). Considering the entire approach of the book, some have laid charges of rationalism against Qoheleth. They hold that Qoheleth deals with abstractions rather than pragmatic matters. Life is not predictable and does not always go according to human expectations. For instance, the race is not to the swift (9:11), and folly and slaves are honored whereas the wise and princes are assigned low places (10:6–7). Some have noted contradictions, like where the Teacher denounces wealth and then acknowledges in 10:19 that money answers everything. Peter Enns observes that the book of Ecclesiastes poses hermeneutical challenges because, firstly, its message seems to be at odds with theological trajectories evident elsewhere in the Hebrew Scriptures, and second, it has noticeable internal inconsistencies.¹

All human activity is ultimately hebel because no human activity produces ideal yitron (advantage, gain or profit). The Hebrew word hebel literally translates vapor, breadth, or wind. Metaphorically, it renders ephemeral, vain, worthless, inconsequential, transient, transitory, and absurd. In the book, hebel refers to such things as pleasure, wealth, labor, justice, and wisdom. Though positive, these values do not provide yitron in the ultimate sense. Mark R. Sneed avows that the word hebel occurs 38 times in the book and is considered the leitmotif of the book by most scholars.² Sneed argues that the word hebel usually has the meaning of futility as directed at human activity. Though in agreement with Sneed up to this point, one could disagree with his evaluation of Qoheleth as an unorthodox sage who challenges traditional norms.

For Stephen M. Coleman, “The significance of hebel for Qohelet is signaled in part by its frequency of use and in part by its appearance at strategic locations as a summary assessment of and verdict on his observations of life under the sun.”³ Coleman stands in agreement with Michael Fox who prefers to translate hebel as absurdity. Fox writes that “the absurd is irrational, an affront to reason … the quality of absurdity is not inherent in a phenomenon but is a relational concept, residing in the tension between a certain reality and a framework of expectations.”⁴ Absurdity, explains Coleman, means that what is so evaluated is not as it appears to be or should be. Coleman continues that permanence, certainty, control, and progress are an illusion in a life lived under the specter of death and that “the chief reason there can be no ultimate gain in this life is that death relativizes the value of every human action. Nothing that mankind can do is of permanent, ultimate, or lasting value.”⁵ There cannot be ultimate yitron in human activities done under the sun. Ultimacy originates from the extrahuman sphere. Qoheleth’s outlook demonstrates optimism with respect to the ultimate gain of fearing God. Ideally, the fact that all is vanity and that death is inevitable drives humanity to fear God.

There are apparent internal tensions in the book. Qoheleth on numerous occasions concludes that life is “meaningless,” but then at crucial points he advocates a lifestyle of joy (Eccles. 2:24–26; 3:12–14, 22; 5:18–20; 8:15; 9:7–10). Obedben Mmesomachukwu Lumanze argues that “thus, the Qoheleth may not have been pessimistic about life but only disturbed about life’s essence in the light of its ephemeral or transient nature.”⁶ For Lumanze, Qoheleth does not mean that life is meaningless or pointless but rather that life is fleeting and temporal. Nothing lasts on earth. God’s provisions should be enjoyed not as absolute but for practical purposes in human existence. Here and in the rest of the book, Qoheleth is not engaging with abstractions nor rationalistic epistemology but with divine revelation.

The fear of God provides the macrostructure for unlocking the message of Ecclesiastes. It is argued that “the theme of Ecclesiastes is the necessity of fearing God in this fallen, confusing world.”⁷ The term “fear of God” as used in this research encompasses a profound sense of reverence, awe, and submission to God on account of divine aseity, glory, righteousness, and majesty. The fear of God is a covenant theme. On the micro level, the theme of the fear of God brings together the three books of Old Testament Wisdom Literature (Prov. 1:7; Job 28; Eccles. 12:13–14). On the macro level, the theme appears in the Pentateuch and the Prophets and thus takes the Old Testament Wisdom corpus on the same theological plane as the rest of the Old Testament.⁸ Following this trajectory, Qoheleth’s anthropology will be internally coherent and externally consistent with that drawn from Proverbs and Job. Then the Old Testament Wisdom anthropology as a package will be internally coherent and externally consistent with that drawn from the rest of the Tanakh. Qoheleth, then, contributes significantly to the development of the Old Testament anthropology.

The argument of the coherence of Wisdom Literature with the rest of the Old Testament gets support from Coleman, who writes from the perspective of the theology of sin. Coleman’s aim is to “demonstrate the coherence of the theology of sin developed in the wisdom literature with the theology of sin found in the rest of Scripture.”⁹

Another area gaining currency in interpretations of Ecclesiastes is the place of the epilogue. Is the purpose of the epilogue to correct the errant theology of Qoheleth or to confirm Qoheleth’s observations? Katharine J. Dell attests that “the Epilogue reinforces Qoheleth’s approach to the wisdom task.”¹⁰ In Katherine’s estimation, the Epilogist does not contradict Qoheleth. She refutes the position that “Ecclesiastes is often seen, with Job, as directed against proverbial wisdom, as ‘wisdom in revolt,’ or protest literature. So, they are both seen as different developments away from an earlier aphoristic model contrasting wise and foolish behavior.”¹¹ Dell sees no revolt in the wisdom of Job and Ecclesiastes. Ecclesiastes 12:13, kol-hāʾādām (lit. “all the man”), is translated in the New International Version as “the whole duty of man.” The whole duty of humanity is to fear God and keep his commandments. The redactor’s conclusion does justice to the heart of Qoheleth.

Biwul proposes a political and economic reading of Ecclesiastes. He writes, “As such, it argues that the Qoheleth uses hebel as a literary rhetorical device as an evaluative grid to critique and indict the negative behavior of the politically powerful and the wealthy, to caution against the reckless abuse of political and economic power to their benefit by those who live in privilege in society.”¹² He avers that Qoheleth proposes the theological ideology of hebel as the totality of human existence in this book. Biwul submits that “hebel plays a ligamentary role in Ecclesiastes. It serves as the pervasive hub that holds together both the spokes and the wheel of the book’s theological centre.”¹³ According to Biwul’s historical reconstruction, Qoheleth was responding to the oppressive sociology of human experience of the Hellenistic era whereby the Hellenistic rulers and Jewish aristocrats were exploiting the underprivileged. Biwul concludes that “Qoheleth’s use of לֶבֶה (hebel) has direct consequence on the political and economic life of those who live in privilege in society.”¹⁴ Though Biwul’s interpretation of Ecclesiastes would help us to counter present-day consumerism and oppressive sociology, he attempts to takes us away from the traditional position of the Solomonic authorship and the tenth-century BC dating.

Tremper Longman III contends that “the Targum interprets the book as a repository of orthodox teaching in perfect harmony with the rest of the canon, particularly the Torah.”¹⁵ T. F. Leong proclaims that “the overall argument—because ‘All is vanity,’ therefore ‘Fear God’—should guide our reading of the speech.”¹⁶ Leong continues that we need to identify clues as to how Qoheleth develops his argument from the theme “All is vanity” to the conclusion “Fear God and keep his commandments.” The reader of Qoheleth should have in the background the Fall of humanity in Genesis 3. In view of the Fall of humanity, frustrations and vexation creeped in under the sun. For example, work that was meant to be enjoyed and fruitful can bring vexation.

II. Carpe Diem Thought in Ecclesiastes?

In Odes Book 1 published in 23 BC, the Roman poet Horace’s work, the phrase carpe diem is part of a longer carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero (pluck/seize the day, put very little trust in the future). The phrase is often understood against Horace’s Epicurean background. One is urged to take advantage of the present experiences and opportunities without concern for and reference to the future, nor defer action and enjoyment to the future. Some scholars have identified the carpe diem thought in Qoheleth. However, the frame of the fear of God and hebel demonstrate the theocentric approach of Ecclesiastes. Additionally, the Teacher has the future in mind, as when he invites the youths to remember their Creator in their youthful phase (11:9–12:8). In the invitation, Qoheleth mentions future judgment, eternal home, and the spirit returning to God who gave it. Qoheleth advances a lifestyle lived in consideration of the future.

Sneed holds that Qoheleth’s primary ethical system appears to be the carpe diem ethic.¹⁷ To paraphrase Sneed, this ethic is framed by pessimism and resignation in the context of hebel and the forthcoming divine judgment. Enns observes that in Ecclesiastes 3:13 and 5:19, the so-called carpe diem passages, “Qohelet affirms that kol-hāʾādām (‘everyone’) is to enjoy pleasure in daily existence. In Ecclesiastes 7:2 Qohelet observes that death is the end (sôp) of kol-hāʾādām.”¹⁸ Sneed proceeds that pleasure and death are two important, indeed, dialectical and pivotal theological themes in Qohelet’s discourse. It will be discussed later whether Qoheleth advances a carpe diem ethic.

Craig G. Bartholomew and Ryan P. O’Dowd contend that the carpe diem (seize the day) sayings are found in Ecclesiastes 2:24–26, 3:10–15, 3:16–22, 8:10–15, 9:7–10 and 11:7–12:7. Bartholomew and O’Dowd contend that rather than promoting a nihilistic hedonism, these passages celebrate the gift of life.¹⁹ The passages speak of eating and drinking, enjoying one’s work, enjoying marriage, and taking pleasure in life as God’s gift. Arthur Keefer maintains that “the carpe diem passages themselves reflect a sort of purpose statement that sets a goal for the present life. In view of incoherence and an unhopeful future, the commendation of joy offers purpose for the present.”²⁰ Keefer maintains that life may be meaningful in the sense of purpose not that of coherence. Contrary to the stance of Keefer, the theme of the fear of God would help us to see both purpose and coherence in Qoheleth.

Three factors suggest the nonexistence of carpe diem belief in Qoheleth—theocentricity, eschatology, and ultimacy. In terms of theocentricity, the present research recognizes that the gifts in these so-called carpe diem passages are theocentric in origin. And the toil, pleasure, and the whole array of human pursuits are theocentric in motive. In Qoheleth’s evaluations, God is foundational. Contrarily, the carpe diem conception is anthropocentric in perspective.

The eschatological dimension is present in that Qoheleth has the future in perspective in his assessment and commendations. Knowledge about eschatology is not reached autonomously by human observation, reasoning, and experience but by divine revelation. Bartholomew and O’Dowd remark that “each succeeding area that Qohelet explores with his epistemology of experience, observation, and reason gets him nowhere.”²¹ Autonomous epistemology cannot lead us to knowledge of eschatology, for example. Ecclesiastes 12:5 teaches that “man goes to his eternal home and the mourners go about the streets.” Chapter 12:14 teaches that God will bring every deed into judgment. In view of the ultimate judgment and justice, argues Coleman, “Qoheleth’s sober warnings and exhortations toward piety suggest that what is done under the sun is of consequence in eternity.”²² One should live with future judgment in mind for the ultimate destination of humanity is the eternal home. Chapter 3:11–14 states that God put eternity in the human heart, but people cannot comprehend what God has done from the beginning. This confirms that knowledge of the existence of eternity has divine origin, is unattainable to the autonomous understanding, and affirms the category of mystery. And our interpretation of the text is that mystery serves to inspire humanity to fear God. Mystery, once construed positively, draws one to a sense of awe and submission before God. Qoheleth views that enjoyment/pleasure should be exercised with the eschatological lens. Enjoy the gifts from God with the future in perspective.²³ Here again, a contrast with carpe diem is noted. In carpe diem thought, there is no consideration about the future but rather an overaffirmation of the present.

Regarding ultimacy, we draw from Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 1940 manuscript “Ultimate and Penultimate Things” in his Ethics.²⁴ Applying Bonhoeffer’s categorization to our discussion, one would consider that issues of pleasure, toil, wisdom, and wealth operate in the penultimate sphere, whereas the fear of God and eternity exist in the ultimate sphere. Thus, the yitron of pleasure, accomplishments, and intellectual pursuits is transient and penultimate, whereas that of the fear of God and the eternal home is ultimate. Truly, Qoheleth does not label toil and pleasure as useless, but he assigns them their rightful place in God’s economy. They are of the penultimate and not the ultimate yitron. Human striving after them leads to pain and frustration. We can conclude that the penultimate should be enjoyed from the perspective of the ultimate. In this categorization, the carpe diem philosophy becomes limited to the penultimate and thus differentiates itself from the theology of Qoheleth. The challenge comes when humanity ascribes ultimacy to the penultimate matters. At the fundamental level of Qoheleth’s interpretation, one discovers the nonexistence of carpe diem thought in the book. The presence of eternity, eschatology, and ultimacy rules out carpe diem in Qoheleth. Qoheleth’s interpreters are consequently moved to drop both the conception and terminology of carpe diem.

III. Qoheleth: Harbinger of Existentialism?

Existentialism is a collection of philosophical views that focus on the individual’s struggle to find meaning and authenticity in a seemingly indifferent or absurd universe. Friedrich Nietzsche is regarded as one of the founders of the movement that developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes that “the Übermensch (Overman) is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth!”²⁵ In Gay Science, Nietzsche announces that “God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!”²⁶ Nietzsche denies the existence of external sources of meaning, arguing that the onus is on humans to create and give meaning to life. The “meaningless” of Nietzsche should be understood in that sense.

Longman III writes that “indeed, Ecclesiastes was a favorite of existentialist theologians such as P. Tillich because the ancient book itself often sounded skeptical.²⁷ Existentialism objected to objective meaning out there—maintaining that existence is not inherently meaningful. Existentialists argue that meaning is created and redefined by human beings. Our assessment is that existentialism is characterized by anthropocentrism and produces an anthropocentric anthropology. The existentialists may have regarded Ecclesiastes as a harbinger of their ideologies. Tillich says, “The spirit of the Preacher is strong today in our minds. His mood fills our philosophy and poetry. The vanity of human existence is described powerfully by those who call themselves philosophers or poets of existence. They are all children of the Preacher, this great existentialist of his period.”²⁸ Here, one observes Tillich identifying existentialists as children of Qoheleth. Tillich should be interpreted here in the broader context of his theological method of correlation, which seeks to achieve a synthesis between Christianity and the modern mind. Tillich writes that his theological system “correlates questions and answers, situation and message, human existence and divine manifestation.”²⁹ In our particular case, Tillich seeks a synthesis between Qoheleth and existentialism. One could notice a distinction between the spirit of Qoheleth, who is thoroughly God centered, and that of existentialism, which is human centered. Tillich could then be critiqued for identifying existentialist traits in the Preacher and for his method of correlation.

IV. Qoheleth and Postmodernism

Existentialism anticipated the skeptical approach of postmodernity. Longman III continues that both Tillich’s existentialism and Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism³⁰ doubt finding meaning in life or in literature. Postmodernity follows the footsteps of existentialism to denounce the belief in objective meaning external to human beings. John S. Feinberg quotes David Griffin, who describes that philosophical postmodernism “deconstructs or eliminates the ingredients necessary for a worldview, such as God, self, purpose, meaning, a real world, and truth as correspondence … this type of postmodern thought issues in relativism, even nihilism.”³¹ The postmodernists instead subscribe to the coherence theory of truth, whereby no claims are assumed as true and so, exempt from objection and critique. And consequently according to the postmodernists, no claims have an assumed privileged status of being foundational to other claims. Feinberg laments that in the postmodern era, “each human consciousness must still structure its understanding of the world, but prospects of justifying one’s beliefs by properly basic beliefs that are self-evident, evident to the sense, or incorrigible are gone.”³² The postmodern epistemology questions epistemological foundationalism and instead adopts nonfoundationalism.

J. A. Smith states: “The wisdom of Qohelet is very postmodern, especially as the cynical wisdom of Ecclesiastes challenges the neat and the tidy world of that presented in the book of Proverbs and in conventional wisdom.”³³ Leon Roper and Alphonso Groenewald identify similarities in thought development between the ancient societies of Job and Ecclesiastes on one hand and the present-day postmodernism on the other. The two scholars claim, nevertheless, that the similarities do not necessarily justify a postmodern tag for the books of Job and Ecclesiastes.³⁴

Roper and Groenewald address three underlying questions. First, can the books of Job and Ecclesiastes be viewed as wisdom books? To this question, they argue that Job and Ecclesiastes are wisdom books, for they are characterized by wisdom thought. The authors follow Schmid, who criticizes a too-exclusive view of wisdom and adopts a broader description of wisdom. Second, if Job and Ecclesiastes are considered wisdom books, is their wisdom revolutionary in nature? Influenced by Scott, Schmid, and Von Rad, the two authors (Roper and Groenewald) hold that Job and Ecclesiastes are wisdom in revolt against the systematization of wisdom, especially the traditional doctrine of retribution. And third, are there any similarities between the thoughts of Job and Ecclesiastes on the one hand and that of postmodern thinkers on the other? Roper and Groenewald identify a reactionary character, whereby Job and Ecclesiastes are “wisdom in revolt” and postmodernism is “modernism in revolt.” In both cases, insist Roper and Groenewald, the reaction seems to develop from a systematization or rigidity of a specific worldview.³⁵

On the first question, the present research agrees with Roper and Groenewald that Job and Ecclesiastes are wisdom books. On the second question, we proffer an alternative view regarding Job and Ecclesiastes, that they present other facets of the Israelite wisdom tradition. Rather than being revolutionary, the two books would be integral to the multidimensional Israelite wisdom tradition. The “in revolt” conception crumbles when applied to Job and Ecclesiastes, for they are not revolting against Proverbs. That established, we approach the third question from an angle different from that of Roper and Groenewald. The similarities between Ecclesiastes and postmodernism in terms of being reactionary would exist only on the superficial but not fundamental level. At the fundamental level, Qoheleth accepts the absolute—that is, the fear of God. In contrast, postmodernity advocates relativism, secularism, and consumerism.³⁶ Additionally, whereas postmodernism mistrusts grand stories or metanarratives, one could hold the fear of God as a grand narrative underlying the message of Qoheleth as well as of the entire Old Testament Wisdom Literature. From other grounds, Tsedey Gebrehiwot contends that “while Job and Ecclesiastes deal specifically with how to live when life appears to have turned upside down, Proverbs presents the ABCs of wisdom when life is generally going right.”³⁷ Gebrehiwot’s view is aligned against the “in revolt” stance.

V. African Christian Anthropological Vision

One of Africa’s anthropological challenges is consumerism. The twentieth century witnessed “the overconsumption of natural resources, endangering the sustainability of society, the economy, and the environment. Consumption-oriented, market-driven marketing practices encourage unsustainable production and consumption.”³⁸ The authors propose consumer citizenship as a tool for addressing both consumer protection and sustainable consumer issues.³⁹ Smirti Kutaula et al. write that while perspectives on ethical consumerism vary in terms of focus on the consumers or companies, “the common thread in these definitions is the agreement on the relationship between consumption and its wider impact on society and environment.”⁴⁰ In the context of emerging markets in Africa, irresponsible consumption negatively affects global sustainable development. And overconsumption is categorized in the present research as an anthropological problem.

According to Fredrik Portin, consumerism is imagined by some theologians and social scientists as, functionally speaking, a form of ersatz religion—weltanschauung in a post-Christian context. He narrates that “consumerism becomes something more than the satisfaction of individual materialistic needs. Rather, it entails a formative practice that shapes the individual’s orientation in life and his or her fundamental outlook in life.”⁴¹ Consumerism is construed as nihilistic in essence, having no telos, not offering the soul any fulfillment and not leading to anything ultimate. Actually, consumerism negatively affects the socioeconomic and ecological lanes in Africa. The rampant corruption, exploitation of the underprivileged, and some elements of environmental degradation arise from unbridled consumerism.

The present research employs Qoheleth’s paradigm of hebel and the fear of God to evaluate the ideology of consumerism. The material and natural resources would not provide yitron in the ultimate sense. Hence, human striving after opulence, status, and prestige becomes hebel. What should we say then? Should humanity embrace a posture of passivity and resignation? Not that. The fear of God will drive humanity to pursue wealth and personal development in godly ways and to avert overconsumption, which tends to glorify humans. And the fear of God would lead humans to the sustainable use of the God-given resources for the benefit of the future generations and the entire cosmos.

Africa is plagued by other moral challenges that arise from anthropological deficiencies. Dilemmas such as corruption, money laundering, wars, ecological crises, poverty, human rights abuses, broken healthcare systems, xenophobia, land grabbing, inefficient public service, nepotism, biased journalism, gender-based violence, and sexual immorality are founded upon anthropological crisis. Moreover, people are neglecting Ubuntu, whose ideals include generosity, hospitality, considering others, justice, and kindness. These ideals have been replaced by egoism and individualism. Ubuntu should not be romanticized, and, owing to the human condition, there are still moral failures even though Ubuntu is cherished. The dilemmas call for transformed anthropology—an anthropology that recognizes hebel for what it actually is, hebel. But what would be the basis of such an anthropological vision? This is where the fear of God should come in to reconfigure humanity.

Under the influence of and in critical engagement with Gerrit Brand, I have proposed that African Christian anthropology should meet the cultural, contextual, and Christian criteria.⁴² The criteria can be adapted to the present discussion. For the cultural criteria, African Christian anthropology should be expressed in African terms, consider African worldview, and address the existential problems in Africa. In terms of the contextual criteria, African Christian anthropology should be liberating, contextual, and in solidarity with the victims of moral lapses. For the Christian criteria, a promising anthropology in Africa would involve remaining in critical conversation with the Christian tradition, remaining faithful to the revelation in Christ, and submitting to the authority of the Scripture. The message of anthropology in Qoheleth should be transmitted in a manner consistent with the cultural, contextual, and Christian criteria outlined above.

The message of Qoheleth points us to the New Testament. Any human striving is hebel and so cannot redeem mankind. Surpassing yitron resides in faith in Jesus Christ, the Saviour of humanity, the perfect image of God and in whom the fullness of the deity dwells bodily. Christ is the center. The Scriptures question: “For what does it profit a man, to gain the whole world and forfeit his life?” (Mark 8:36). The essence of life is in Christ. In other words, what do people gain by accumulating hebel at the expense of eternal life in Jesus Christ? The theme of the fear of God extends to the New Testament. In 2 Corinthians 7:1 it says, “Since we have these promises, beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from every defilement of body and spirit, and make holiness perfect in the fear of God.” The fear of God leads to spiritual and moral purification that will help Christians in Africa to overcome the dilemmas. And in Hebrews 12:28–29 we read, “Therefore let us be grateful for receiving a kingdom that cannot be shaken, and thus let us offer to God acceptable worship, with reverence and awe; for our God is a consuming fire.” Here, Christians are commanded to worship in the fear of God for giving us his kingdom that is firmly established. Christians fear God through Jesus Christ who reconciles us with God the Father.

VI. Conclusion

The research discovered that drawing anthropology from Qoheleth depends upon one’s interpretation of the book. I submit an interpretation of Qoheleth that is faithful to God’s revelation. The Hebrew concept of hebel and the theme of the fear of God constitute the interpretive framework for Qoheleth. This frame of interpretation exonerates Qoheleth from the charges of asceticism, skepticism, pessimism, hedonism, fatalism, rationalism, and anti-intellectualism leveled against him. The frame presents the book as unified without any contradictions. Rather than succumbing to the negative evaluation of Qoheleth, one is led into mystery, which in turn directs us to the fear of God. Once the charges have been disproved and the category of mystery accepted, a cogent theological anthropology, built upon the fear of God, will be developed from Qoheleth. This article attempts to become programmatic for future research dealing with anthropology in Qoheleth.

The so-called carpe diem passages would not fit that designation on account of their theocentricity, eschatology, and ultimacy. The carpe diem thought is purely anthropocentric, autonomous, and this-moment focused. On the other hand, Qoheleth’s epistemology derives from divine revelation.

Qoheleth cannot be a harbinger of existentialism, for the two proceed from clearly distinct and irreconcilable foundations. The “meaninglessness” of Qoheleth is distinguished from the existentialists’ one. We are called upon to explore further manifestations of twenty-first century existentialist thought and employ Qoheleth’s anthropology in addressing them.

Furthermore, though some have seen similarities between Qoheleth’s theology and postmodern thought, closer examination shows fundamental differences between them. Instead, the fear of God in Qoheleth is foundational and constitutes an absolute which should frame existence. Qoheleth could actually be a resource for examining the nonfoundationalism of the postmodern epistemology. Contrarily, postmodernism questions the existence of absolute truths and metanarratives.

The research recognizes that the moral lapses plaguing Africa such as corruption, violence, and consumerism are attributable to the anthropological lapses; hence the call for humanity in Africa that is recreated and reconfigured by the fear of God—a humanity that discerns hebel, accepts that hebel is devoid of ultimate yitron, recognizes that ultimate yitron essentially resides in the fear of God, and incorporates the ideals of Ubuntu.

Finally, who transcends? The Übermensch? The postmodern humanity? The carpe diem-framed mankind? Any other autonomous person? None of these, for they are all characterized by hebel inclinations. Who then transcends? The one who fears God and keeps his commandments. This one transcends beyond the hebel-oriented penultimate life to embrace the ultimate yitron found in the fear of God. This is the vision of the transcendent theological anthropology in Africa within the fold of Qoheleth’s anthropology.